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This paper describes the rapid and sustained economic 
growth which Indonesia achieved during the three decades of 
President Soeharto’s New Order rule. Rapid economic growth 
was accompanied by rapid social development and a steep 
reduction in absolute poverty. From being the ‘chronic 
underperformer’ in Southeast Asia in the early 1960s, Indonesia 
by the early 1990s had become one of the high-performing 
Asian economies (HPAEs). However, by the late 1980s the New 
Order’s political legitimacy had eroded as the regime became 
more blatantly corrupt and self-serving. In economic policy this 
was reflected by an erosion in fiscal discipline as off-budget 
expenditures outside the control of the Department of Finance 
were spent on ambitious development projects the economic 
viability of which were questionable. The New Order collapsed 
when it was unable to deal effectively with the Asian economic 
crisis.
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I. Introduction
After experiencing hyperinflation and economic decline during the 
final years of President Sukarno in the early 1960s, Indonesia 
experienced rapid and sustained economic growth for three decades 
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under the New Order government of President Soeharto. Rapid and 
sustained economic growth was accompanied by a steep reduction in 
the incidence of absolute poverty from 40% of the population in 
1976 to 11% in 1996.  
However, focusing only on the New Order’s economic achievements, 
while disregarding its failings gives a biased view of the era. Given 
the general view in Indonesia after the Asian economic crisis that the 
New Order brought economic ruin to the country, this paper 
attempts to present a more balanced account of both the economic 
and social achievements as well as failings of the New Order.
II. From ‘Asian Miracle’ to ‘Asian Crisis’
After the New Order government had restored monetary stability 
after the hyperinflation left by the Sukarno government and 
rehabilitated the dilapidated productive apparatus and infrastructure, 
the Indonesian economy since the late 1960s experienced an 
unprecedented rapid and sustained growth for the next three 
decades. Rapid and sustained economic growth during the New 
Order transformed Indonesia from Southeast Asia’s ‘chronic 
underperformer’ in the early 196Os into a ‘high-performing Asian 
economy’ (HPAE) in the early 1990s. During this period rapid 
industrial growth also transformed Indonesia from an agrarian 
economy into a ‘newly-industrialising economy’ (NIE) along with 
Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank 1993, p. 1).
Like the other HPAEs, Indonesia’s rapid growth was underpinned 
by high rates of capital investment, including investment in human 
capital, and high rates of TFP (total factor productivity) growth 
(World Bank 1993, pp. 28-9, 40-8).
Indonesia's rapid economic growth during the New Order was 
accompanied by rapid social development, as reflected by a steady 
decline in absolute poverty, steady growth in private consumption 
per capita, steady rise in life expectancy at birth, and steady decline 
in the adult illiteracy rate. Moreover, unlike in most other developing 
countries, Indonesia's rapid economic growth was not accompanied 
by worsening income distribution.
However, by July 1997, only two months after the release of a 
fairly upbeat World Bank report on the medium-term prospects for 
the Indonesian economy, market sentiments about the Southeast 
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Asian economies, including the Indonesian economy, suddenly 
changed for the worse. As a result, the currency markets in these 
countries came under pressure, causing the currencies, including 
the Indonesian rupiah, to depreciate rapidly, as foreign and domestic 
investors scrambled to purchase U.S. dollars to reduce their exposure 
to these countries, including Indonesia. 
In late October 1997 the Indonesian government turned to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a standby arrangement to 
restore market confidence, and thus contain the currency crisis. The 
government hoped that with the availability of a large IMF standby 
loan, backed by a credible economic reform program to be 
implemented by the Indonesian government and sanctioned by the 
IMF, market confidence in the rupiah could be restored (Sadli 1999, 
p. 17). This was the second time that the New Order government had 
turned to the IMF, since at the beginning of its reign in 1966 IMF 
assistance was sought to combat hyperinflation (Booth 1998, p. 178).
However, IMF's involvement failed to restore market confidence 
because of political uncertainty about President Soeharto's health 
and serious doubts about the President’s commitment to faithfully 
implement the economic reform program. As the rupiah continued to 
depreciate by 80 per cent in January 1998, inflation rose to 60 per 
cent, while the economy contracted sharply. Absolute poverty, which 
had declined steadily during the New Order era, began to rise again. 
To aggravate matters, Indonesia was also hit by the severe El Nino 
drought which damaged the rice harvests, and by falling oil prices 
which reduced the government’s oil revenues and export revenues.
Within less than a year Indonesia was transformed from a ‘miracle 
economy', extolled by the international aid community and many 
foreign economists as a development model worthy of emulation by 
other developing countries, into a ‘melted down economy' dependent 
on the charity of the international aid community to prevent an 
economic breakdown. The worsening economic crisis caused the 
economy to contract by almost -13.1% in 1998, far worse than the 
-3.0% economic contraction in 1963 (World Bank 1998, p. 2.1). The 
economic distress, caused by the inability of the Indonesian 
government to contain the economic crisis, led to a serious political 
crisis which forced President Soeharto to resign in disgrace after 
holding power for 32 years. Thus Soeharto's New Order regime, 
which had emerged triumphantly in 1966 in the wake of a serious 
economic and political crisis caused by President Sukarno's 
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government, ended ignominiously in another serious economic and 
political crisis.
III. Indonesia’s Economic and Social Development in 
   Regional Perspective, 1965-97
A. Economic Development
Rapid and sustained economic growth under the New Order 
enabled Indonesia to graduate from the rank of ‘low income 
countries’ into the ‘lower middle income countries' by the early 
199Os as its per capita income rose from U.S.$ 100 to U.S.$ 1,000 
during this period. With the economy growing at an average annual 
rate of 7.0 per cent during the period 1965-97, Indonesia's real GNP 
roughly doubled every 10 years. Due to a successful family planning 
program introduced by the government in the early 1970s, popula- 
tion growth over the period 1965-97 slowed down to an average 
annual rate of less than 2.0 per cent, one of the lowest among 
developing countries. With average economic growth exceeding 
average population growth by almost 5.0 per cent, Indonesia 
experienced a rapid increase in per capita GNP (Gross National 
Product). This was much higher than most other developing 
countries, and compared favourably with the other HPAEs. Rapid per 
capita GNP growth led to rising standards of living, as reflected by 
the high average growth of private consumption (Table 1).
Indonesia's economic growth was underpinned by rapid and 
sustained expansion of gross domestic investment, which also 
compared favourably with the other HPAEs. However, Indonesia's 
export expansion was not as impressive as that of the other HPAEs. 
This can be attributed to the fact that Indonesia, unlike other 
HPEAS, relied largely on primary exports, particularly oil and gas 
exports during the 1970s. The Indonesian government only made a  
serious effort to promote manufactured exports after the oil boom 
had ended in 1982. The resulting surge in manufactured exports, 
however, was short-lived, since after 1993 manufactured export 
growth slowed down. Many observers attributed the slowdown to 
strong international competition and the relatively low international 
competitiveness of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector.
During the New Order era rapid economic growth led to 
considerable economic and social structural change (Table 2). These 
INDONESIA’S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 267
TABLE 1





















































97 1965-97 1965-97 1965-97 1965-97 1965-97 1965-97 1965-97
Indo-
nesia 7.O 4.8 2.O 2.7 3.9 9.1 7.9 7.2 9.2 5.7
Malaysia 6.8 4.1 2.6 3.1 3.7 8.5 7.1 6.1 1O.1 9.7
Thai-





8.2 6.7 1.5 2.6 2.O 12.3 8.2 7.4 12.4 16.O
Hong 
Kong 7.6 5.7 1.8 2.6 - - - 8.O 7.7 11.9
Singa-
pore 4.4 6.3 1.9 3.1 -1.4 8.6 8.3 6.7 9.6 12.2
Japan 4.4 3.6 O.8 1.1 -O.1 4.5 4.7 4.2 4.7 7.7
Source: World Bank (1999, Table 1.2, pp. 16-9)
structural changes are reflected in the shift of production from 
agriculture to manufacturing and modern services; the relative 
decline of the agricultural labour force and the growth of urban 
centres; the greater role of trade in the economy; the increasing role 
of the central government in the economy; and the monetization of 
the economy as a result of stable economic management (World 
Bank 1999, p. 31).
The data in Table 2 show that among the HPAEs, Indonesia's 
economic transformation was the most remarkable as the country in 
1970 was much more dependent on agriculture than any other 
HPAE. Compared to the rapid economic transformation, structural 
change in the occupational distribution of the labour force was much 
less rapid, as reflected by the fact that the share of the labour force 
employed in agriculture in 1990 was much higher than the share of 
agricultural value added in GDP. The reason for this was that labour 
productivity in the non-agricultural sectors rose faster than in 
agriculture (Manning, 1998, p. 89).
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TABLE 2

























NIEs 197O 1997 197O 1997 197O 1997 197O 1997 197O 1997 197O 1997
Indo-
nesia
45 16 66 55 17 37 28 56 13 17 8 5O
Malaysia 29 12 54 27 34 55 8O 187 2O 23 31 97
Thai-
land





27 6 49 18 41 83 38 77 15 22 29 45
Hong 
Kong
- O 4 1 88 95 181 267 - - - 2O6
Singa-
pore
2 O 3 O 1OO 1OO 232 358 21 24 62 82
Japan 6 2 2O 7 71 78 2O 19 11 - 69 112
Note: 1) Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside 
banks, demand deposits other than those of the central 
government and the time, saving, and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sectors other than the central government. This measure 
of the money supply is called M2.
Source: World Bank (1999, Table 1.5, pp. 28-31)
During this period Indonesia also became a more urbanised 
society, with more than one third of its population living in urban 
areas. Foreign trade too became more important to the economy, 
accounting for more than half of GDP by 1997.
However, the relative size of the central government in the 
Indonesian economy, as reflected by the ratio of central government 
revenue to GDP, was less than the two other NIEs due to the 
relatively weak taxation efforts of the government. Prior to 1983, 
income tax collection in Indonesia was complicated and weak, 
allowing for ‘tax haggling' between taxpayer and tax collector 
(Glassburner 1983, p. 30). Although the tax reforms of 1984 
following the end of the oil boom era in 1982 were quite successful 
in raising non-oil taxes, Indonesia's ratio of non-oil tax revenues to 
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GDP of 17 per cent is relatively low compared to the other HPAEs. 
This low tax ratio was not only due to the rather narrow tax base, 
but also because the tax office was and still is inefficient and 
corrupt, while the political will to increase tax compliance levels was 
inadequate (Asher and Booth 1992, p. 49).
Although the Indonesian economy in 1997 was much more 
monetized than in 1970, it was less monetized than the two other 
NIEs, namely Malaysia and Thailand. The fact that Indonesia's 
agricultural sector (of which a significant part was not yet 
commercialised up to the early 1970s) played such an important role 
in the economy may account for the fact that Indonesia's economy 
was less monetised than other East Asian countries.
B. Social Development
Rapid economic growth during the Soeharto era was accompanied 
by rapid social development, as indicated by various social indicators 
(Table 3).
Per capita consumption levels, an indicator of the effect of 
economic development on the welfare of individuals (World Bank 
1999, p. 19), rose rapidly in Indonesia over the period 1980-97. 
Although positive growth rates are generally associated with a decline 
in absolute poverty, the poor may not share or share less from the 
improvement of welfare if income distribution is highly unequal 
(World Bank 1999, p. 19). After correcting the rate of growth of 
private consumption per capita for the degree of income inequality, 
per capita consumption growth in Indonesia was still quite high, 
even higher than the two other Southeast Asian NIEs.
Indonesia made rapid progress in education, as reflected by the 
increase in net primary enrollment ratios of both male and female 
students. In 1980 Indonesia's net primary enrollment ratios were 
already quite high as a result of the government's large investments 
in the expansion of primary education, particularly in the rural 
areas. This expansion was made possible by the oil boom windfall 
gains in the 1970s (Jones 1994, p. 164). The data in Table 3 show 
that in the 1980s the goal of universal primary education had largely 
been achieved, assisted by slower growth of the primary school age 
population due to the successful family planning program.
Indonesia also made rapid progress in the expansion of primary 
health care, as reflected by the steep decline in infant mortality rates 
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Male % of 
relevant age 
group
Female % of 
relevant age 
group
NIEs 198O 1996 198O 1996 197O 1997 1996
Indonesia 4.5 3.O 93 99 83 95 118 47 65
Malaysia 3.1 1.6 - 1O2 - 1O2 45 11 89





7.O - 1O4 92 1O5 93 46 9 83
Hong 
Kong
5.2 - 95 88 96 91 19 5
Singapore 4.9 - 1OO - 99 - 2O 4 1OO
Japan 2.9 - 1O1 1O3 1O1 1O3 13 4 96
Note: 1) Distribution corrected growth of private consumption per capita is 1 
minus the Gini index multiplied by the annual rate of growth in 
private consumption per capita.
Source: World Bank (1999, Table 1.2, pp. 16-19)
over the period 1970-97 and the provision of safe water to the 
population. This progress, however, is less impressive compared to 
the achievements of the two other NIEs, and much less impressive 
compared to the achievements of the three Asian ‘Tigers', as reflected 
by Indonesia's much higher infant and maternal mortality rates. The 
percentage of Indonesia's population having access to safe water is 
also much less than in the two other NIEs and the Asian ‘Tigers'. 
The data in Table 3 show that Indonesia's achievements in social 
development, while considerable, were less impressive than the achieve- 
ments of the two other NIEs and the Asian ‘Tigers' (Hill 1996, p. 7).
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TABLE 4
THE DECLINE IN ABSOLUTE POVERTY IN INDONESIA, 1976-96 
(% OF PEOPLE UNDER OFFICIAL POVERTY LINE)
Year







































Source: For period 1976-1996, see: Badan Pusat Statistik: Statistical Year 
Book of Indonesia, 1998, Jakarta, June 1999, Table 12.1, p. 576.
IV. Absolute Poverty and Relative Inequality
A. Absolute Poverty
One of the remarkable achievements of the New Order government 
was its success in combining rapid growth with a steady reduction 
in the incidence of absolute poverty, while maintaining a moderate 
relative inequality (distribution of income). Estimates by Indonesia's 
Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) indicated 
that the incidence of absolute poverty steadily declined from 40 per 
cent of the population in 1976 to 11 per cent in 1996. This steady 
decline in poverty took place in both urban and rural areas (Table 
4).
The corresponding number of people in poverty fell from around 
54 million people in 1976 to 23 million people in 1996 (Badan Pusat 
Statistik 1999, p. 576). This steep reduction in absolute poverty was 
quite remarkable, as reflected by a comparative World Bank study on 
poverty alleviation in several developing countries. This study found 
that over the period 1970-87 the average annual reduction in 
absolute poverty in Indonesia was much higher than in the other 
developing countries (World Bank 1990, p. 45).
In the 1970s this remarkable achievement was caused by the 
successful stabilisation of food prices which, particularly in Java, 
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meant that the poor experienced a lower rate of inflation than the 
rich. The growth in agricultural production during the 1970s and 
early 1980s was made possible by the government's commitment to 
broad-based rural development, as reflected by the successful 
dissemination of new production technologies in the food crop 
(particularly rice) sector, which generated new employment oppor- 
tunities in production, processing, and marketing. The oil booms of 
the 1970s also spurred rapid growth of the non-tradable sectors, 
including construction and trade, which created new employment 
opportunities for the large number of unskilled workers (Booth 2000, 
p. 81).
Absolute poverty kept falling even when the government was forced 
to pursue tight fiscal and monetary policies following the end of the 
oil boom era in 1982. One reason why the budget cuts after 1982 
did not prevent a further decline in poverty was that the cuts were 
made in the capital-intensive sectors, including energy, and in the 
transmigration program and the subsidies to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), which did not much affect employment (Booth 2000, p. 85). 
After the resumption of rapid growth in the late 1980s, poverty 
declined at a slower rate than during the immediate post-oil boom 
period, particularly in the rural areas. This development may be 
largely due to the fact that during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
the agricultural sector was relegated to a secondary role as reflected 
by a falling share of budgetary resources. With greater priority being 
given to large-scale, capital-intensive manufacturing (including 
hi-tech projects, such as the aircraft industry), modern services and 
physical infrastructure, economic policies after 1987 arguably 
became less pro-poor (Booth 2000, pp. 89-90).
Despite the steady downward trend in absolute poverty during the 
Suharto era, the poverty estimates based on the official poverty line 
do understate the actual incidence of absolute poverty. Indonesia's 
official poverty line is lower than the poverty lines in neighbouring 
countries, such as the Philippines which has approximately the same 
level of per capita income as Indonesia (Booth 1992b, p. 637).  
Nevertheless, a higher poverty line would still show a similar 
downward trend in the incidence of absolute poverty, although it 
would naturally show a higher absolute poverty level than under the 
official poverty line. The steady decline in absolute poverty according 
to the official poverty line may also have made the Indonesian 
government complacent about the poverty problem, since people 
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TABLE 5














Sources: 1) For the period 1964/65-1987: Hill (1996, Table 10.1, p. 193)
         2) For the years 1993-95: World Bank (1998, Table 2.8, pp. 69-71)
         3) For the year 1996: World Bank (1999, Table 2.8 pp. 70-73)
slightly above the official poverty line were still vulnerable to fall 
below the poverty line in economically difficult times.
B. Relative Inequality
Another indicator of social welfare is relative inequality, which 
refers to the degree of inequality in the distribution of income in an 
economy. This is reflected in the percentage share of either income 
or consumption accruing to segments of the population ranked by 
income or consumption levels. The segments ranked lowest by 
personal income receive the smallest share of total income (World 
Bank 1999, p. 73). The extent to which the distribution of income (or 
consumption expenditures) deviates from a perfectly equal distribu- 
tion can be provided by a summary measure, the Gini index. This 
indicator reveals that income distribution in Indonesia had remained 
fairly constant during the New Order era (Table 5).
The World Bank’s ‘East Asian Miracle’ study found that over the 
period 1965-89, Indonesia was quite successful in combining rapid 
economic growth with low relative inequality. In fact, over this period 
Indonesia achieved higher per capita GDP growth with lower income 
inequality than the two other East Asian NIEs, Malaysia, and 
Thailand (World Bank 1993, p. 31). 
Despite the statistical evidence of fairly constant Gini indices, 
many Indonesians held the view that economic growth, particularly 
during the late New Order era, had widened inequality. This 
perception was strengthened by the rise of large conglomerates, 
many of them owned and controlled by relatives and cronies of 
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former President Suharto, and by the opulent lifestyle of the rich 
elite.
Insofar as an unequal income distribution reflects an unequal 
distribution of wealth or productive assets (Ahluwalia and Chenery 
1974, p. 43-4), Indonesia's rapid economic growth may indeed have 
led to greater relative inequality since rising asset concentration 
could be expected during rapid economic growth. This asset 
concentration could have included both physical assets (land, 
ownership of companies, banks, and other economic entities) and 
non-physical assets (human capital, made possible by access to high 
quality education, including overseas tertiary education by the 
privileged groups in society). However, in the absence of reliable data 
on wealth or asset distribution, the perception of ‘unequalizing 
growth' during the late New Order era may be impressionistic.
C. Regional Income Disparities
Another aspect of relative inequality concerns the disparity in 
average incomes between the various provinces in Indonesia. 
Estimates by the World Bank have indicated that per capita GPP 
(gross provincial product) and per capita consumption in all 
Indonesian provinces improved during the period 1983-93, a period 
for which consistent regional accounts are available. Indicators on 
social development also confirm this development, as they show 
improvements, including a steady decline in the incidence of 
absolute poverty, in all provinces (World Bank 1996, p. 92).
Despite these improvements, by the mid-1990s Indonesia still 
faced the problem of persistent regional income disparities, although 
the extent of regional income disparities over the period 1986-96 had 
become less as the poorest provinces, including West and East Nusa 
Tenggara, were able to grow rapidly (World Bank 1996, p. 92). For 
instance, while in 1986 East Kalimantan, the richest province, had a 
GPP per capita 18 times higher than East Nusa Tenggara, the 
poorest province, by 1996 this regional income disparity had dropped 
to 11 to 1. These figures still indicate a high disparity, but at least 
progress had been achieved in ameliorating this disparity (Table 6).
The data in Table 6 show that the degree of disparity in GPP per 
capita between the rich and poor provinces is high by international 
standards due to the concentration of some of the country's most 
valuable natural resources, notably oil, natural gas, other minerals 
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TABLE 6
PER CAPITA GROSS PROVINCIAL PRODUCT (GPP) AND PER CAPITA 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES IN SOME OF THE RICHEST AND 
POOREST PROVINCES IN INDONESIA, 1986-96 (THOUSANDS OF RUPIAH)
Province
Per capita GPP Per capita 
Household 
consumption
1986 1996 1986 1996





































Note: After the Asian economic crisis the Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS (Central 
Bureau of Statistics) changed its name into Badan Pusat Statistik, 
BPS (Central Agency of Statistics).
Sources: 1) BPS: Regional Income of Provinces by Expenditure, 1983-1990, 
Biro Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, February 1993.
         2) BPS: Gross Regional Domestic Product of Provinces in Indonesia 
by Expenditure, 1994-1997, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, 
November 1998; For Gross Provincial Product (GPP) data: Table 
38, p. 8; For household consumption data: Table 39, p. 39.
         3) For population data: BPS: Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 
1988, Jakarta, January 1989, Table 3.1.3, p. 28; BPS: 
Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1999, Jakarta, June 2000, 
Table 3.1.3, p. 47.
and timber, in a few sparsely-populated provinces, notably Aceh, 
Riau, East Kalimantan, and Papua (Booth 1992c, p. 41). The oil and 
gas operations in these resource-rich provinces are enclaves with 
little linkages to the local economies. Before the introduction of 
regional autonomy in early 2001, the revenues from oil and gas 
exports accrued to the central government which constitutionally 
owns these resources. This meant that a considerable portion of the 
Gross Provincial Product (GPP) generated in these resource-rich 
provinces was transferred to the central government. The central 
government then redistributed part of the revenues from oil and gas 
back to these resource-rich provinces through its spending and 
transfers to the regional governments (World Bank 1996, p. 93).
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Part of these revenues were also transferred to the poorer 
provinces in order to ameliorate regional income disparities. Through 
these fiscal transfers, supplemented by financial support from the 
international aid community, social expenditures across the 
provinces could be sustained (World Bank 1996, p. 92). 
The transfer of huge financial resources from the resource-rich 
provinces, as reflected by their large export surpluses, understan- 
dably led to serious discontent, including separatist movements in 
some provinces, namely Aceh and Papua. The people in these 
resource-rich provinces were quite aware that, while their provinces 
were among the richest in terms of per capita GPP, their living 
standards, as reflected by their per capita consumption expenditures, 
were much lower than their per capita GPP levels would warrant. 
They were also aware that living standards in Jakarta, the capital, 
were much higher than in their own region (Table 6). 
After the introduction of regional autonomy in 2001, the resource- 
rich regions could keep a large part of the resource revenues to 
finance their own needs. However, with a much greater share of the 
resource revenues accruing to the local governments of the resource- 
rich regions, the ability of the central government to ameliorate 
regional income disparities through fiscal transfers to poor regions, 
has naturally declined.
V. The Environmental Impact of Economic Growth
During the first decade of the New Order, the Indonesian 
government put a high priority on rapid economic growth without 
much regard to the adverse environmental consequences, specifically 
resource degradation and resource depletion. Resource degradation 
was very serious in regard to land and water resources as it involved 
a process of ecological adjustment from an originally stable level to a 
lower and often less stable level of productivity (Hardjono 1994, p. 
179). Resource depletion was not only a problem with non-renewable 
resources, like minerals, but also with renewable resources, like 
timber. 
Because of the indiscriminate felling of trees and burning of 
Indonesia's tropical hardwood forests which has persisted until 
today, one of Indonesia's most valuable natural resources have been 
seriously depleted. In fact, as early as 1988 the World Bank 
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estimated that the rate of deforestation was nearly 900,000 hectares 
a year, due to conversion of unsuitable lands to agriculture, poor 
logging practices and natural and man-made disasters (World Bank 
1988, p. 92).    
By the late 1970s the adverse environmental impact of rapid 
industrialisation and greater use of motor vehicles, particularly air 
and water pollution, became increasingly serious. Air pollution has 
worsened due to increasing urbanization, motorization and industria- 
lization. In Sumatra and Kalimantan and even in neighbouring 
Singapore and Malaysia, air pollution has worsened because of forest 
fires due to large scale land conversion in the former two islands 
(World Bank 2003, p. 3).      
To deal with the adverse environmental consequences of rapid 
economic growth, President Soeharto in 1978 appointed Emil Salim 
as Indonesia's first Minister for the Environment. Professor Salim 
was instructed to find a path of sustainable development in which 
economic development could be combined with protection of the 
environment (Salim 1997, p. 62). As a Minister of State, however, 
Salim was not an executive agent and had to work through other 
ministers who were mostly concerned with their own sectoral 
concerns, and therefore indifferent, if not opposed, to Salim's views 
on environmental protection (Salim 1997, p. 64).
VI. The Erosion of Political Legitimacy of the New Order 
   Government
The New Order government political legitimacy was based on 
economic performance, particularly on its ability to deliver rising 
standards of living for the people. This required rapid and sustained 
economic growth, and the opening up new employment and business 
opportunities as a means for escaping poverty.
Rapid and sustained economic growth seemed to be assured in the 
late 1980s following the restoration of macroeconomic stability and 
the wide-ranging deregulation measures taken in response to the end 
of the oil boom era in 1982. However, from the late 1980s many 
observers and academic economists began to voice growing concern 
about various economic and social issues which in their view 
threatened to undermine not only long-term growth, but also the 
cherished national goal of establishing a ‘just and prosperous society' 
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(masyarakat adil dan makmur). Many of these issues were 
inter-related and included the massive scale of corruption at all 
levels of the government bureacracy and the embezzlement of public 
funds for private gain, collusive relationships between political power 
holders and their business cronies, many of them Sino-Indonesian 
tycoons, and the proliferation of policy-generated barriers to domestic 
competition and trade, which created lucrative, rent-seeking 
opportunities.
These restrictions on domestic competition were of particular 
concern to Indonesian economists, as they adversely affected the 
business environment for bonafide entrepreneurs. Although successive 
trade reforms since the mid-1980s had steadily reduced the 
‘anti-export bias’ of Indonesia's trade regime, domestic competition 
and trade faced various restrictive regulations, particularly in the 
agricultural sector. Restrictions on domestic competition included 
cartels, price controls, entry and exit controls, exclusive licensing, 
dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in certain industries, 
and ad hoc interventions by the government in favour of specific 
firms or sectors (Iqbal 1995, p. 14).
These restrictions on domestic competition and trade were often 
justified on grounds of ‘national interest', such as the promotion of 
domestic value added in processing activities (wheat flour, soymeal), 
exploitation of Indonesia's markets (plywood), revenue raising for 
local governments, and the ‘essential' nature of certain commodities, 
the distribution of which was considered too important to be left to 
the market (cement, fertilizer) (World Bank 1995, p. 46). However, 
the justifications of these restrictions on domestic competition were 
mere excuses for blatant ‘rent-seeking activities', which yielded huge 
monopolistic and/or monopsonistic rents to politically well-connected 
businessmen and their political patrons, both in the central and 
local governments. Aside from the policy-generated barriers to 
domestic competition, politically well-connected businessmen also 
received preferential access to credit provided by state-owned banks, 
protection against import competition, and tax and duty exemptions.
The corrosive effects of these ‘KKN' (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme) 
practices eroded the legitimacy of the government. ‘KKN' practices 
also gave rise to the widely-held view about the ‘widening economic 
gap' between rich and poor and between non-indigenous (mostly 
Sino-Indonesians) and indigenous Indonesians, which undermined 
the social cohesion required for political stability and national 
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Since the early 1990s many economists also expressed growing 
concern about the erosion of the government’s financial discipline. 
This was reflected by the allocation of off-budget funds outside the 
control of the Department of Finance to finance controversial and 
costly projects. These projects included the so-called ‘national car’ 
project of the President’s youngest son, and the costly ‘hi-tech' 
projects promoted by Dr. Habibie, the powerful State Minister of 
Research and Technology, particularly the aircraft industry, the 
economic viability of which were often questionable (Nasution 1995, 
pp. 4-5).  
In the end, the abuses by the increasingly corrupt and oppressive 
New Order regime eroded its political legitimacy, as overt criticism 
led to ruthless suppression, by violence if necessary, and ultimately 
led to its infamous downfall when the regime was unable to deal 
effectively with the Asian economic crisis. Ironically, President 
Soeharto's downfall was basically precipitated not so much by a 
people's revolt, but by the ‘invisible market forces' which had caused 
the steep depreciation of the rupiah which Soeharto failed to 
comprehend and deal with effectively. Thus the New Order regime 
came to its inglorious end amidst the misery of a seriously damaged 
economy, which had to rely on large infusions of foreign and 
domestic loans to prevent an economic breakdown. The costs of this 
hugely enlarged foreign and domestic debt will continue to be a 
burden on the Indonesian economy for many years to come.
(Received 17 May 2006; Accepted 10 January 2007)
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